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Abstract
Deep reinforcement learning has achieved state-of-the-
art performance in single-agent games, with a drastic de-
velopment in its methods and applications. Recent works
are exploring its potential in multi-agent scenarios. How-
ever, they are faced with lots of challenges and are seeking
for help from traditional game-theoretic algorithms, which,
in turn, show bright application promise combined with
modern algorithms and boosting computing power. In this
survey, we first introduce basic concepts and algorithms in
single-agent RL and multi-agent systems; then, we summa-
rize the related algorithms from three aspects. Solution
concepts from game theory give inspiration to algorithms
which try to evaluate the agents or find better solutions in
multi-agent systems. Fictitious self-play becomes popular
and has a great impact on the algorithm of multi-agent re-
inforcement learning. Counterfactual regret minimization
is an important tool to solve games with incomplete infor-
mation, and has shown great strength when combined with
deep learning.
1. Introduction
No man is an island entire of itself. We live in a world
where people constantly interact with each other, and most
situations we confronted with every day involve cooperation
and competition with others. Though recent years have wit-
nessed dramatic progress in the field of AI, its application
will still be limited until intellectual agents have learnt how
to cope with others in a multi-agent system. The first at-
tempt of defining multi-agent systems (MAS) dates back to
2000, when Stone and Veloso defined the area of MAS and
stated its open problems [1], and the number of algorithms
and applications in this area has been rising ever since. In
the last decade, multi-agent learning has achieved great suc-
cess in games which were once considered impossible for
AI to conquer, including games with tremendous number of
states like Go [2], Chess and Shogi [3], games with incom-
plete information like Texas Holdem [4] and Avalon [5],
and multi-player video games with extremely high com-
plexity like Dota 2 [6] and StarCraft [7].
The main reason for the current success in multi-agent
games is the combination of techniques from two main ar-
eas: deep reinforcement learning and game theory. The for-
mer provides powerful algorithms for training agents with a
particular goal in an interactive environment, but it cannot
be straightforwardly applied to a multi-agent setting [8]; the
latter is born to analyze the behavior of multiple agents, but
is developed mainly in theory, with algorithms capable of
solving problems in a very small scale.
Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) is the combination
of reinforcement learning (RL) and deep learning. RL [9]
is an area of machine learning concerned with how agents
ought to take actions in an environment in order to max-
imize some notion of cumulative rewards. Deep learning
[10] is a class of machine learning algorithms that uses
neural networks (NN) to extract high-level features from
the raw input. Before the prevalence of deep learning, RL
needs manually-designed features to represent state infor-
mation when it comes to complex games; neural network
can serve as an adaptive function approximator, allowing
RL to scale to problems with high-dimensional state space
[11] and continuous action space [12] [13] [14].
By adopting such approximator, DRL is proved to be
successful in single-player games with high-dimensional in-
put and large state space like Atari [15]. However, straight-
forward application of DRL to multi-agent scenarios only
achieved limited success both empirically [16] and theoreti-
cally [17]. Modeling other agents as part of the environment
makes the environment adversarial and no longer Markov,
violating the key assumption in the original theory of RL
[9].
Therefore, a mature approach has to consider carefully
the nature of a multi-agent system. Compared with single-
agent game where the only agent aims to maximize its own
payoff, in a multi-agent system the environment includes
other agents, all of whom aim to maximize their payoffs.
There are special cases such as potential games or fully co-
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operative games where all agents can reach the same global
optimal; however, under most circumstances an optimal
strategy for a given agent does not make sense any more,
since the best strategy depends on the choices of others. In
game theory [18], researchers are focused on certain solu-
tion concepts, like some kind of equilibrium, rather than
optimality [19].
Nash equilibrium [19] is one of the most fundamental
solution concepts in game theory, and is widely used to
modify single-agent reinforcement learning to tackle multi-
agent problems. However, Nash equilibrium is a static so-
lution concept based solely on fixed point, which is lim-
ited in describing the dynamic properties of a multi-agent
system like recurrent sets, periodic orbits, and limit cy-
cles [20] [21]. Some researchers try to establish new so-
lution concepts more capable of describing such proper-
ties, and use them to evaluate or train agents in a multi-
agent system. The attempts include bounded rationality
[22] and dynamic-system-based concepts such as Markov-
Conley Chain (MCC), proposed by α-rank [21] and applied
in [23] and [24].
In addition to focusing on solution concepts, some game-
theoretic algorithms have sparked a revolution in computer
game playing of some of the most difficult games.
One of them is called is called fictitious self-play [25],
which is a sample-based variant of fictitious play [26], a
popular game-theoretic model of learning in games. In this
model, players repeatedly play a game, at each iteration
choosing a best response to their opponents average strate-
gies. Then the average strategy profile of fictitious players
converges to a Nash equilibrium in certain classes of games.
This algorithm has laid the foundation of learning from self-
play experiences and has a great impact on the algorithm of
multi-agent reinforcement learning, producing many excit-
ing results including AlphaZero [3] when combined with
enough computing power.
Another one of them is called counterfactual regret min-
imization [27], which is based on the important game-
theoretic algorithm of regret matching introduced by Hart
and Mas-Colell in 2000 [28]. In this algorithm, players
reach equilibrium play by tracking regrets for past plays,
making future plays proportional to positive regrets. This
simple and intuitive technique has become the most pow-
erful tool to deal with games with incomplete information,
and has achieved great success in games like Poker [4] when
combined with deep learning. In this survey, we will focus
on the above two algorithms and how they are applied in re-
inforcement learning, especially in competitive multi-agent
RL.
This survey consists of four parts: Section 2 includes
the basic concepts and algorithms in single-agent reinforce-
ment learning, as well as basic concepts of multi-agent sys-
tem; Section 3 mainly describes the inspiration that solution
concepts give to multi-agent RL; Section 4 states how ficti-
tious self-play grows into an important tool for multi-agent
RL; Section 5 gives an introduction for counterfactual regret
minimization and its application in multi-agent RL.
2. Background
2.1. Single-Agent Reinforcement Learning
One of the simplest forms of single-agent reinforcement
learning problems is the multi-armed bandit problem [29],
where players try to earn money (maximizing reward) by
selecting an arm (an action) to play (interact with the envi-
ronment). This is an oversimplified model, where the situa-
tion before and after each turn is exactly the same. In most
scenarios, you may face different conditions and take mul-
tiple actions in a row to complete one turn. This introduce
the discrimination between states and their transitions.
More formally, a single-agent RL problem can be de-
scribed as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [9], which
is a quintet < S,A,R, T, γ > where S represents a set of
states and A represents a set of actions. The transition func-
tion T : S × A −→ ∆(S) maps each state-action pair to a
probability distribution over states. Thus, for each s, s′ ∈ S
and a ∈ A, the function T determines the probability of go-
ing from state s to s′ after executing action a. The reward
function R : S×A×S −→ R defines the immediate reward
that an agent would receive when transits from state s to s′
via action a; sometimes the reward can also be a probability
distribution on R. γ ∈ [0, 1] defines the discount factor to
balance the trade-off between the reward in the next transi-
tion and rewards in further steps, and the reward gained k
steps later are discounted by a factor of γk in the accumula-
tion.
The solution of MDP is a policy pi : S −→ ∆(A), which
maps states to a probability distribution of actions, indicat-
ing how an agent chooses actions when faced with each
state. The goal of RL is to find the optimal policy pi∗ to
maximize the expected discounted sum of rewards. There
are different techniques for solving MDPs assuming all of
its components are known. One of the most common tech-
niques is the value iteration algorithm [9] based on the Bell-
man equation:
vpi(s) = Ea∼pi(s)Es′∼T (s,a)[R(s, a, s′) + γvpi(s′)] (1)
This equation expresses the value (expected payoffs) of a
state under policy pi, which can be used to obtain the op-
timal policy pi∗ = argmaxpivpi(s) i.e. the one that maxi-
mizes the value function.
Value iteration is a model-based RL algorithm since it
requires a complete model of the MDP. However, in most
cases an environment is either not fully known or too com-
plicated. For this reason, model-free algorithms are more
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preferred, which learn from experiences of interacting with
the environment in a sample-based fashion.
There are two kinds of model-free RL algorithms, value-
based and policy-based. Value-based algorithms optimize
the policy by tracking the values of states or state-action
pairs, and choosing better actions according to these values.
Q-learning is one of the most well-known of them. A Q-
learning agent learns a Q-function, which is the estimate of
the expected payoff starting in state s and taking action a as
Q(s, a). Whenever the agent transits from state s to s′ by
taking action a with reward r, the Q table is updated as:
Q(s, a) = Q(s, a)+α[(r+γmaxbQ(s
′, b))−Q(s, a)] (2)
where α is the learning rate. It is proved that Q-learning can
converge to the optimal Q∗ if each state-action pair is vis-
ited infinitely often under specific parameters [30] [31]. The
most famous value-based method in DRL is the Deep Q-
network (DQN) [11], which introduces deep learning into
RL by approximating theQ function with a deep NN, allow-
ing RL to deal with problems with high-dimensional state
space like pixel space. Moreover, since the neural networks
are capable of extracting features by themselves, manual
feature engineering with prior knowledge is no longer nec-
essary.
Policy-based algorithms take another route, which di-
rectly learn parameterized policies based on gradients
of some performance measures using gradient descent
method. One of the earliest work is REINFORCE [32],
which samples full episode trajectories with Monte Carlo
methods to estimate return. The policy parameters θ, where
pi(a|s, θ) ≈ pi(a|s), is updated as:
θn+1 = θn + αGn
∇pi(An|Sn, θn)
pi(An|Sn, θn) (3)
where α is the learning rate and G is the discounted sum
of rewards. However, pure policy-based methods can have
high variance [9] and actor-critic algorithms [33], a combi-
nation of value-based and policy-based methods, have been
proposed. They use actors to learn parameterized policies
and critics to learn value functions, which allows the pol-
icy updates to take into consideration the value estimates to
reduce the variance compared to vanilla policy-based meth-
ods.
Combining policy-based methods with deep learning is
straightforward since the parameterized policy can be di-
rectly replaced with a deep NN, and there are many variants
of them. Deep deterministic policy gradient (DDPG) [12]
addresses the issue of large action space by adding sampled
noise, such as noise drawn from Ornstein-Uhlenbeck pro-
cess [34], to its actor’s policy, allowing more exploratory
behavior. Asynchronous Advantage Actor-Critic (A3C)
[35] is a distributed algorithm where multiple actors run-
ning on different threads interact with the environment si-
multaneously and compute gradients in a local manner. UN-
REAL framework [36] is based on A3C and proposes unsu-
pervised auxiliary tasks like reward prediction to accelerate
the learning process. Importance Weighted Actor-Learner
Architecture (IMPALA) [37] is another distributed algo-
rithm that allows trajectories of experience to be communi-
cated between actors and a centralized learner. Trust Region
Policy Optimization (TRPO) [13] and Proximal Policy Op-
timization (PPO) [14] are state-of-the-art policy-based DRL
algorithms, where changes in policy are incorporated to the
loss function by adding KL-divergence to the loss to prevent
abrupt changes in policies during training.
2.2. Markov Game and Nash Equilibrium
While MDP models single-agent game with discrete
time, the framework of Markov games, or stochastic games
[38] , models multi-agent systems with discrete time and
non-cooperative nature. An n-player Markov game is de-
fined [39] by a tuple < S,A1, ..., An, r1, ..., rn, p >, where
s is the state space, Ai is the action space of player i,
ri : S × A1 × ... × An −→ R is the payoff function for
player i, p : S × A1 × ... × An −→ ∆(S) is the transi-
tion probability map, where ∆(S) is the set of probability
distributions over state space S. Given state s, agents in-
dependently choose actions a1, ..., an, and receive rewards
ri(s, a1, ..., an), i = 1, ..., n. The state then transits to the
next state based on the transition probabilities. Specifically,
in a discounted Markov game, the objective of each player is
to maximize the discounted sum of rewards, with discount
factor γ ∈ [0, 1). Let pii be the strategy of player i, for a
given initial state s, player i tries to maximize
vi(s, pi1, ..., pin) =
∞∑
t=0
γtE(rit|pi1, ..., pin, s0 = s) (4)
Nash equilibrium is one of the most fundamental solu-
tion concepts in game theory. It is a joint strategy profile
where each agent’s strategy is a best response of the oth-
ers’. Specifically, for a Markov game, a Nash equilibrium
is a tuple of n strategies (pi1∗, ..., pi
n
∗ ) such that for all state
s ∈ S and i = 1, ..., n,
vi(s, pi1∗, ..., pi
n
∗ ) ≥ vi(s, pi1∗, ..., pii−1∗ , pii, pii+1∗ , ..., pin∗ )
for all pii ∈ Πi
(5)
where Πi is the set of all strategies available to agent i.
In general, the strategies that constitute a Nash Equilib-
rium can be either stationary strategies or behavior strate-
gies which allow conditioning of actions on history of play.
In 1964 Fink [40] proved that every n-player discounted
stochastic game possesses at least one Nash equilibrium
point in stationary strategies, as a enhanced conclusion of
Nash’s theorem in [41].
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3. Solution Concepts
3.1. Without Solution Concepts: Independent RL
Although algorithms for single-agent reinforcement
learning are not designed for multi-agent systems because
the assumptions from which they are derived are invalid,
there are a group of works studying and analyzing the be-
haviors directly using independent DRL agents in multi-
agent settings, modeling other agents as part of the envi-
ronment.
Tampuu et al. [42] trained two independent DQN learn-
ing agents to play the Pong game. They tried to adapt the
reward functions to achieve either cooperative or competi-
tive settings. Later, Leibo et al. [43] also tried independent
DQNs but in the context of sequential social dilemmas. This
work showed that cooperative or competitive settings can
not only affect discrete actions, but also change the whole
policies of agents.
Recently, Bansal et al. [44] trained independent learning
agents with PPO using the MuJoCo simulator [45]. They
applied two modifications to deal with the multi-agent na-
ture of the problem though. First, they used exploration
rewards which are dense rewards to allow agents to learn
basic, non-competitive behaviors, and reducing this type of
reward through time, giving more weight to the environ-
mental, competitive reward. Second, they maintained a col-
lection of older versions of the opponent to sample from,
rather than always using the most recent version, to stabi-
lize the behavior changes over the training process.
Raghu et al. [16] investigated how different DRL algo-
rithms, including DQN, A2C and PPO, performed in a fam-
ily of two-player zero-sum games with tunable complexity,
called Erdos-Selfridge-Spencer games, which is a param-
eterized family of environments and the optimal behavior
can be completely characterized. Their work showed that
different DRL algorithms can show wide variation in per-
formance as the game’s difficulty is tuned.
3.2. RL towards Nash Equilibrium
To tackle multi-agent problems, directly using single-
agent reinforcement learning proves invalid, and efforts are
made to better understand the nature of multi-agent systems.
The first step is taken by Littman in 1994 [46], who pointed
out that for many Markov games, there is no policy that is
undominated because performance depends critically on the
choice of opponent. Instead, each policy should be eval-
uated with respect to the opponent that makes it look the
worst. He proposed Minimax-Q in the setting of two-player
zero-sum Markov game, where the opponent is not mod-
eled as part of the environment but one that rationally makes
your policy worse. Minimax-Q is a modification of single-
agent Q-learning, where the original Q(s, a) is substituted
with Q(s, a, o), representing the expected payoff for taking
action a when the opponent chooses action o from state s
and continuing optimally thereafter. The updating rule be-
comes:
Q(s, a, o) = Q(s, a, o) + α[(r + γV (s′)))−Q(s, a, o)]
where V (s) = max
pi∈∆(A)
min
o∈O
Ea∼piQ(s, a, o)
(6)
Then in 2001, he proposed Team-Q [47] to tackle an-
other special case of Markov games called team Markov
game, where agents share the same reward function i.e.
have the same objective. In this case, Qi(s, a1, ..., an) is
the Q-function of agent i and the updating rule becomes:
Qi(s,~a) = Qi(s,~a) + α[(r + γVi(s
′)))−Qi(s,~a)]
where Vi(s) = max
~a∈A(s)
Qi(s,~a)
(7)
In this work, he pointed out that Minimax-Q and Team-Q
can be considered as two special cases of a more general
algorithm called Nash-Q, because both algorithms are up-
dating the Q-function with values from Nash equilibrium,
either in cooperative or competitive scenarios. In the same
year, he unified them into Friend-and-Foe-Q [48], where co-
operation equilibrium and adversarial equilibrium can co-
exist in a multi-agent system, and the update of Q-function
is unified into:
Qi(s,~a) = Qi(s,~a) + α[(r + γVi(s
′)))−Qi(s,~a)]
where Vi(s) = max
pi∈∆(X1)×...×∆(Xk)
min
y1,...,yl∈Y1×...×Yl
Ex1,...,xk∼piQi(s, x1, ..., xk, y1, ..., yl)
(8)
where X1, ..., Xk are the actions available to the k friends
of player i and Y1, ..., Yl are those of l foes, based on the
idea that i’s friends are working together to maximize i’s
value, while i’s foes are working together to minimize i’s
value.
Although Littman had suggested a general Nash-Q algo-
rithm in [47], it was not until Hu et al. [49] that a formal
formulation of Nash-Q and poof of convergence were pro-
posed. In this work, the Q-function is updated by:
Qi(s,~a) = Qi(s,~a) + α[(r + γNashi(s
′)))−Qi(s,~a)]
(9)
whereNashi(s) is agent i’s payoff in state s in the selected
Nash equilibrium. It is proved that Nash-Q converges un-
der a strict condition that, every stage game during learning
has either a global optimal or a saddle point, and they are
always selected to update the Q-function, where a saddle
point means a Nash equilibrium where each agent would
receive a higher payoff when at least one of the other agents
deviates.
Shortly after, multiple variants of Nash-Q were proposed
in a very similar fashion. Greenwald [50] used a gen-
eral form of Nash equilibrium called correlated equilibrium
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[51], which is a probability distribution over the joint space
of actions, where all agents optimize with respect to oth-
ers’ probabilities, conditioned on their own. He proposed
Correlated-Q and its four variants focused on different cor-
related equilibrium, as an attempt to unify the previous
works:
1. maximize the sum of the players rewards
2. maximize the minimum of the players rewards
3. maximize the maximum of the players rewards
4. maximize the maximum of each individual player is
rewards
In the same year, Ko¨no¨nen [52] introduced Asymmetric-Q
to deal with Stackelberg leadership model, a game where
the leader moves first and the follower move sequentially.
Based on the hierarchical equilibrium solution concept
called Stackelberg equilibrium [53], Asymmetric-Q uses a
updating rule of Q-function similar to Nash-Q, except in a
hierarchical learning order.
3.3. Beyond Nash Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium proves to be powerful in several spe-
cific types of games, but it has never been compatible with
general-sum games with more than two players. When
Nash equilibrium is applied to reinforcement learning,
small changes in the values of joint-actions may cause a
large change in the states Nash equilibria, making the train-
ing unstable and unable to converge [54]. There are at-
tempts, both theoretically and experimentally, to bypass the
incompatibility by either redefining the equilibrium [55]
or straightforwardly applying the algorithm for two-player
zero-sum games to general-sum games with more than two
players [56], but these attempts only provide limited success
in specific scenarios.
Another problem is that Nash equilibrium is notoriously
hard to compute. Chen and Deng [57] proved that calcu-
lating Nash equilibrium for general-sum games is PPAD-
complete for two players, which requires exponential-time
algorithm. Even if all the equilibria are found, there is no
guarantee which equilibrium an algorithm would fall in;
it may probably find an ineffective equilibrium with less
payoff for both agents. There are researches about other
kinds of equilibrium such as Stackelberg equilibrium [53]
[52]. However, these equilibrium can only deal with spe-
cific types of problems, far less useful than Nash equilib-
rium defined for general scenarios. Therefore, current stud-
ies about game theory in RL are still limited in the few types
of games Nash can solve, including two-player zero-sum
games and team Markov games.
Recently, researchers from DeepMind proposed an al-
gorithm called α-rank [21] for ranking the performance of
different agents in a multi-agent system. In this work, they
introduced a new solution concept called Markov-Conley
Chain (MCC), based on strongly sink connected compo-
nents on transition graphs of Markov chains, which can be
seen as a discrete version of dynamic systems in contin-
uous space. According to the Conley’s theorem [58], the
domain of any dynamic system can be decomposed into
its chain components with the remaining points transient,
leading to the recurrent part by a complete Lyapunov func-
tion. Therefore, under the solution concept based on dy-
namic systems, there exists a potential function, which is a
complete Lyapunov function, as the incentive of optimiza-
tion for all agents. Such games, called potential games, have
Nash equilibrium at local optima, thus greatly simplifying
the process of finding equilibrium.
α-rank is inspired by evolutionary algorithms. Consider
a monomorphic population wherein all individuals play
identical strategies, and a monomorphic population profile
consisting multiple populations where each population may
be playing a different strategy. Mutation rate is fixed to a
very small number so that each time there is at most one
individual in one population that is mutated. Individuals are
constantly chosen from each population to involve in the
game and be evaluated and those with better performance
have better chance to reproduce. So the only mutation will
either spread until taking over the whole population, or be
wiped out.
Since the result of mutation only ends up in changing be-
havior of the whole population or not, this process can be
viewed as a random walk of the whole monomorphic pop-
ulation profile on states of different strategy profiles, where
adjacent states differ by exactly one agent’s strategy. This
graph is called ”response graph”. More specifically, the
transitional matrix of this Markov process can be written
as:
ρkski ,skj
(s−k) =

1− e−α(rki −rkj )
1− e−mα(rki −rkj )
if rki 6= rkj
1
m
if rki = r
k
j
(10)
Ci,j =

ηρkski ,skj
(s−k) if ∃k such that ski 6= skj and s−ki = s−kj
1−
∑
j 6=i
Ci,j if si = sj
0 otherwise
(11)
where Ci,j is the transition probability from strategy profile
i to profile j, rki and r
k
j are the rewards of agent k in pro-
file i and j, ski is k-th player’s strategy in profile i and s
−k
i
is others’ strategies in profile i, η is the reciprocal of ad-
jacent strategy profile, α is a hyper-parameter standing for
the harshness of natural selection and m is the number of
individuals in each population.
After constructing such Markov chain, its stationary dis-
tribution can be calculated and the larger probability a pro-
file has, the stronger and more robust it is, which can be
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used to rank different strategy profiles. When α goes to in-
finity, all probability on the graph will eventually converge
to the sink strong connected component of the directed re-
sponse graph, where one profile is connected to another if
and only if there exists a player with utility improvement.
Therefore, the complete Lyapunov function guaranteed by
Conley’s theorem serves as an approximate potential func-
tion on the response graph, which is the theoretical basis of
the algorithm.
The invention of a new solution concept and its
corresponding ranking algorithm provides a powerful
polynomial-time tool for strategy analysis of multi-agent
general-sum games, bypassing the limitations of Nash equi-
librium and surpassing Elo, which can perform badly when
there is no total-order relations or there is a large population
of low-level agents. Later, Torreno et al. [59] generalizes
this algorithm to partially observable environments. How-
ever, researchers from Huawei [24] claim that α-rank is im-
practical, for they use strategy profiles to conceal the expo-
nential essence of their algorithms with respect to the num-
ber of strategies and agents. Instead, they propose a scalable
alternative called αα-rank based on MCC, which is capable
of evaluating tens of millions of strategy profiles. Their key
idea is to use sample-based stochastic optimization instead
of a linear-algebra-based solution, and solving the station-
ary distribution is rewritten as an optimization problem to
minimize the distance of a vector and the vector multiplied
by the distribution matrix in this case.
4. Fictitious Self-Play
4.1. Classical Fictitious Play
Fictitious play is first proposed by Brown in 1951 [26].
In fictitious play, each agent models other agents’ average
strategies, and play the best response against them. The pro-
cess is repeated until convergence if possible. It is proved
that the original fictitious play can converge to Nash equilib-
rium for two-player zero-sum games [60], 2*2 games [61],
potential games [62], games with an interior ESS [63] and
certain classes of super-modular games [64].
However, since best response is generically pure, a
player’s choices under fictitious play are sensitive to the
values of the opponents’ average strategy, and experiments
can never converge to a mixed Nash equilibrium (even if
players have a mixed best response in mind). Worse still,
fictitious play does not provide convergence guarantee for
general sum games. Therefore, Fudenberg and Kreps intro-
duced stochastic fictitious play [65]. Their setting assumes
that in a standard game where players move simultaneously,
each player privately observes a small noise on their pay-
offs. This noise turns the original game into a stochastic
game and smooths the best response, turning it into a con-
tinuous function, as is shown in Fig. 1.
Figure 1. The best response has been smoothed” into a continuous
function by introducing noise. BR stands for best response and
δ1, δ2 are for two strategies. The picture is from [66].
The benefits are threefold. First, by creating a continu-
ous function, we can correspond the (possibly mixed) equi-
librium of the original game with each Nash equilibrium
of the perturbed game. Second, such uncertainty prevents
the player’s strategy from being deduced and exploited by
others. Third, this is a model more consistent with actual
human psychology [66].
In their work, it is proved that under some assumptions
any mixed-strategy equilibrium of the original game is a
limit of pure-strategy Bayesian equilibrium of the perturbed
game, when the noise approaches zero [66]. Later, Perkins
et al. [67] further proved that stochastic fictitious play con-
verges to an equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games and
its variant converges to an equilibrium in negative-definite
single-population games with continuous action sets.
For games that admit a unique Nash equilibrium, the em-
pirical distribution of stochastic fictitious play almost surely
converge to the Nash equilibrium. It is later proved by
[68] that four special types of games can converge globally:
games with an interior ESS (Evolutionary Stable Strategy),
zero-sum games, potential games and all super-modular
games. Super-modular games are a special type of games
where the marginal value of one player’s action will in-
crease due to other players’ actions.
4.2. RL with Fictitious Self-Play
There are two main obstacles preventing fictitious play
from incorporating reinforcement learning. For one thing,
fictitious play is an algorithm that requires playing best re-
sponse to others’ average strategies in each stage, while re-
inforcement learning is a learning algorithm that optimizes
the policy, slowly moving to the best response. For another,
fictitious play is designed on normal-form games, while re-
inforcement learning is modeled on MDPs, which can be
seen as extensive games with multiple steps. Rewriting
an extensive game in matrix form is extremely inefficient
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because it can yield exponentially large state and action
spaces.
Genugten [69] unintentionally took the first step of com-
bining fictitious play and reinforcement learning, when he
proposed weakened fictitious play in two-player zero-sum
games, where agents play a better response to others’ av-
erage policy instead of best response. In this work, he in-
troduced -best response, the set of response with reward r
so that r ≤ R −  when R is the best response, where 
is initially large but asymptotically vanishing to 0. Weak-
ened fictitious play is originally invented for speeding up
the process of convergence, but it unintentionally opens
the door for machine learning algorithms like reinforce-
ment learning, which slowly optimizes the policy towards
best response. Later, Leslie et al. [70] generalized the set-
ting from two-player zero-sum games to general-sum games
with more than two players.
Then in 2015, Heinrich et al. [25] proved a critical
lemma based on Kuhn’s theorem [71] that for a player with
perfect recall, any mixed strategy is realization-equivalent
to a behavior strategy, and vice versa. Heinrich’s lemma
gives the method of mixing normal-form strategies by a
weighted combination of realization-equivalent behavior
strategies. The formal statement is as follows: Let pi and β
be two behavior strategies, Π andB be two mixed strategies
that are realization-equivalent to pi and β, and λ1, λ2 ∈ R≥0
with λ1 + λ2 = 1. Then for each information state u ∈ U ,
µ(u) = pi(u)+
λ2xβ(δu)
λ1xpi(δu) + λ2xβ(δu)
(β(u)−pi(u)) (12)
defines a behavioural strategy µ and µ is realization equiv-
alent to the mixed strategy M = λ1Π + λ2B.
This formula expresses mixed strategies in extensive-
form games without rewriting them into normal-form
games. By using deep reinforcement learning (DQN in his
work) and imitation learning for the calculation of best re-
sponse and average policies, Heinrich proposed Neural Fic-
titious Self Play (NFSP) [25] in the same paper, marking the
beginning of fictitious self-play entering multi-agent rein-
forcement learning. In 2016, Heinrich generalized NFSP to
partially observable environments, achieving superhuman
performance on limited Texas Poker [72]. It is worth noting
that deep reinforcement learning serves not only as a pow-
erful calculation method, but also as an end-to-end solver
eliminating the need to manually design features with prior
knowledge in specific fields.
More attempts are made to combine RL algorithms with
fictitious play. Zhang et al. [73] proposes MC-NFSP, which
uses Monte Carlo tree search to further enhance the best
strategy. In the tree search, the agents choose action to
maximize a weighted sum of Q-function and an exploration
reward, thus enhancing the exploration ability of the self-
play. The paper also proposes Asynchronous NFSP (AN-
FSP), which is an extension of original NFSP to allow dis-
tributed training. Perolat et al. [74] builds a stochastic ap-
proximation of the fictitious play process with an architec-
ture inspired by actor-critic algorithms. In this algorithm,
the actor and critic updates their policy together towards
best response, and it is proved that in a zero-sum two-player
multi-state game, this algorithm converges to a Nash equi-
librium.
4.3. Applications of Fictitious Self-Play
There are many applications of fictitious self-play in re-
inforcement learning, mostly related to adversarial training
and evolutionary algorithms. Gupta et al. [75] use self-
play to simultaneously train a cyber attacker and defender.
The attacker attempts to deform the input from ground truth
to reduce the performance of an RL agent, while the de-
fender functions as a preprocessor for that agent, correct-
ing the deformed input. LOLA algorithm [76], proposed
by OpenAI, takes the opponents’ gradient into considera-
tion in adversarial training, and achieves fancy results us-
ing self-play on complicated environments such as MuJoCo
[45]. Kawamura et al. [77] empirically combine policy gra-
dient algorithms with NFSP and successfully apply it on a
non-trivial RTS game. AlphaGo and its successors [3] com-
bine self-play with deep reinforcement learning and Monte
Carlo tree search, achieving state-of-the-art performance
on two-player zero-sum games like Go, Chess and Shogi.
Sukhbaatar et al. [78] use self-play to conduct an unsuper-
vised curriculum learning, letting the agents learn about its
environment without giving a reward function.
Double oracle [79] is a well-known variant of fictitious
self-play on two-player zero-sum games, which is designed
for adapting environment with a reward function correlated
with the opponent’s behavior. In the algorithm, the ”oracle”
stands for the mechanism to calculate the best pure strate-
gic response of any mixed strategy of both sides. The al-
gorithm starts from a small set of actions, and both sides
calculate the optimal mixed strategy against the previous
set. Then, both sides assume that the opponent will take the
optimal mixed strategy, and calculate the best pure strate-
gic response against them, which is added to the set. The
process is repeated until the set no longer grows. Bosˇansky´
[80] extends double oracle to extensive-form games, where
the agents choose a sequence of actions from a set of action
sequences, and the best response sequence is added for next
iteration. Double oracle is proved to converge to a mini-
max equilibrium for two-player zero-sum games, and has
applications in security scenarios [81].
Policy Space Response Oracle (PSRO) [82] is a grand
unified model of fictitious play, independent reinforcement
learning and double oracle, for all of them are specific in-
stances of PSRO. PSRO is built on meta-game analysis,
inherited from empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA)
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[83]. For every specific game to solve, there exists a meta-
game whose action is to choose a policy. A finite set of
policies is maintained as a population, which grows as more
policies are explored later in training. For each agent in
each episode, a set of opponents’ policies is sampled from
the population and a best response (the oracle) is calculated,
which will be included in the population in the next itera-
tion. Final output of the algorithm is some kind of combina-
tion of the population. As for fictitious play, the final output
is the average policy of the entire population; as for inde-
pendent reinforcement learning, the output is the last policy
of the population. One of the most successful application of
PSRO is AlphaStar by DeepMind [7], which achieves pro-
fessional level in the multi-player video game StarCraft.
As a meta-game solver, PSRO is compatible with high-
level solution concept. Recently, there are attempts [23] to
combine PSRO with α-rank [21] to get theoretical proof of
performance for general-sum games with multiple agents.
In a high-level perspective, PSRO iteratively calculates the
best response and puts it in the population, which is ex-
actly the process where probabilities ”flow” on the response
graph of strategy profiles until converging to the station-
ary distribution, as is described in α-rank. It is proved that
PSRO will converge with respect to MCC, i.e. to the unique
sink strongly connected components in response graph, on
two-player symmetric games and, if the oracle only find
strategies that are not in the population, converge on any
game. Unfortunately, there is no efficient way to implement
such oracle to calculate best response, so MCC is almost no
better than Nash equilibrium when it comes to scalability in
practical use.
5. Counterfactual Regret Minimization
5.1. Regret Matching
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is by far the
most successful family of algorithms to solve complicated
extensive-form games, and also a strong weapon in the ar-
senal of multi-agent RL. CFR is based on regret matching
algorithm, which is brought forth by Hart and Mas-Colell
[28] to adaptively learn a correlated equilibrium by self-
play. Intuitively, regret matching is an algorithm where
agents analyze their history and update their policy in a
”what-if” manner. For example, in a repeated rock-paper-
scissor game, when an agent chooses rock and loses to pa-
per, it will consider what would happen had it played paper
or scissor, and cope with the opponent who prefers paper
better, as is shown in Table 1. However, simply choosing
best response is problematic: not only can this be exploited
by a clever adversary, but it is also not practical when the
calculation of best response is ineffective e.g. requires ex-
ponential time. Therefore, regret matching gives a stochas-
tic response where the probability of actions is proportional
Round Action Opponent CR ND
0 N/A N/A (0, 0, 0) (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
1 rock paper (0, 1, 2) (0, 1/3, 2/3)
2 scissor rock (1, 3, 2) (1/6, 1/2, 1/3)
3 rock scissor (1, 1, 1) (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
Table 1. Regret matching in the rock-paper-scissor game. The cu-
mulative regrets (CR) and next distributions (ND) are of (rock,
paper, scissor).
to their cumulative positive regrets i.e. the gain of payoff
had it played this action before. In the example above, the
agent will play scissor twice more likely than paper in the
next round, while the actions are arbitrarily chosen if there
are no positive regret. It is proved that the distribution of the
agents’ response will converge to the correlated equilibrium
when the game is played enough times.
Regret matching can be viewed as an online learning al-
gorithm where the regrets are learned to model other agents’
strategies, and the bound of cumulative regret plays an im-
portant role in its performance and convergence. Hart and
Mas-Colell proved in the original paper [28] that the cumu-
lative regret grows sublinearly with respect to the number
of rounds played. Greenwald et al. [84] gives the bound
of regret for a generalized form of regret matching, where
the probability distribution of actions in the next round can
be proportional to the polynomial or exponential form of
cumulative regret. More theoretical results are done by
Orazio et al. [85] [86] to use function approximators in re-
gret matching in the context of deep learning. In the litera-
ture of reinforcement learning, however, most work is based
on the original form [28] where the probability of actions is
proportional to cumulative regret.
5.2. CFR, CFR+ and MCCFR
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) [87] uses re-
gret matching algorithm to cope with extensive-form games
with an exponential number of strategies with respect to
steps of the game, and is born to be compatible with par-
tially observable environment. Formally, let RTi (I, a) be
the regret for player i in round T in information set I choos-
ing action a, piσ
t
−i(I) be the probability of entering I consid-
ering the strategies of every player but i in round t, σt|I→a
be the strategy profile identical to σt except that player i
always plays a in I . Then the regret can be calculated as:
RTi (I, a) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
piσ
t
−i(I)(ui(σ
t|I→a, I)− ui(σt, I))
(13)
and the agents update their policies for the next round as:
RT,+i (I, a) = max(R
T
i (I, a), 0) (14)
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Figure 2. The comparison between CFR, MCCFR and VR-
MCCFR. The picture is from [94].
δT+1i (I, a) =

RT,+i (I, a)∑
a∈A(I)R
T,+
i (I, a)
if denominator > 0
1
|A(I)| otherwise.
(15)
where A(I) is the action set in information set I . It is
proved [87] that the regret bound is O(1/
√
T ), and is fur-
ther improved to O(1/T 0.75) by Farina et al. [88].
In 2014, Tammelin et al. [89] [90] brought forth a variant
of CFR algorithm called CFR+ by substituting the regret
matching algorithm in CFR by regret matching plus. The
regret matching plus algorithm calculates the regret as
RTi (I, a) = R
T−1
i (I, a)+vi(σ
T |I→a, I)−vi(σT , I) (16)
where the counterfactual value [91] vi(σ, I) is the expecta-
tion utility of playing strategy profile σ, which is always 0
unless information set I is reached.
Traditionally, due to the prohibitive time complexity for
traversing the whole game tree for extensive-form games,
the deployment of CFR in large-scale games such as Lim-
ited Texas Hold’em requires prior knowledge and non-
trivial work for state abstraction [87] [92]. Monte-Carlo
counterfactual regret minimization (MCCFR) [93] is pro-
posed to reduce the time complexity, which is a sample-
based variant of CFR. There are two variants of the algo-
rithm: outcome sampling and external sampling, both of
which can compute an approximate equilibrium. In out-
come sampling, only a single episode of the game is sam-
pled at each iteration, and only the nodes on the path of
the game tree in this episode are updated. Since the nodes
are sampled according to the opponents’ strategy, there is
no need to explicitly know the opponents’ strategy. Exter-
nal sampling samples only the chance nodes (external to the
player) and the opponents actions, which is proved to make
an asymptotic improvement in computational time of equi-
librium.
However, Monte Carlo methods are known to be of high
variance. To reduce the variance of Monte Carlo method,
Schmid et al. proposed a variant of MCCFR called VR-
MCCFR [94] to speed up the sampling process and re-
duce the empirical variance. In VR-MCCFR, an action-
dependent baseline is defined for each information set in
a manner similar to advantage actor-critic (A2C), which al-
lows estimates to bootstrap from other estimates within the
same episode while remaining unbiased. The algorithm is
also compatible with CFR+ [89], and its comparison with
CFR and MCCFR is shown in Figure 2. Later, Johanson
et al. proposed several sampling methods for MCCFR and
MCCFR+ [91]. The core contribution of their work is the
proposal of public-chance sampling (PCS) where only the
public-chance events (the uncertainty from nature) are sam-
pled. It is proved both theoretically and empirically that
PCS can significantly accelerate the training process. There
are also attempts to reduce the variance by replacing Monte-
Carlo by other sampling methods [95]. However, MCCFR
is the basis of most recent works on CFR, and it is the notion
of ”counterfactual value” that makes Deep CFR possible.
5.3. Deep CFR and its Applications
As the calculation of regret becomes infeasible in large-
scale extensive-form games, researchers turn to function
approximators for help. The first CFR variant that uses a
function approximator is the regression CFR proposed by
Waugh et al. [96], which uses regression tree as the func-
tion approximator. However, this algorithm has two draw-
backs. First, handcrafted features about information sets
have to be manually designed for the input of the approx-
imator, thus prior knowledge is required. Second, just as
vanilla CFR, regression CFR traverses the whole game tree,
which makes it unbearably costly with respect to time com-
plexity in non-trivial games.
The milestone that marks CFR eventually joins the fam-
ily of multi-agent DRL algorithms is the invention of deep
counterfactual regret minimization [97]. Deep CFR inher-
its both the notion of counterfactual value and the sampling
method (external sampling in their method) of MCCFR. In
this algorithm, a value network is trained to estimate the
counterfactual value, whose goal is to approximate the re-
gret value that tabular CFR would have produced. Mean-
while, a policy network is trained to approximate the av-
erage strategy played over all iterations, which is optional
when there is enough memory to store the policy of every
iteration. Later, they propose several weight functions [98]
such as linear CFR with weight t, and discounted CFR with
weight t
α
tα+1 for iteration t, to put more weight on the recent
regret and strategy when calculating cumulative regret and
the average strategy. Steinberger [99] simplified deep CFR
and reduced the approximation error by abandoning the pol-
icy network used to approximate the average strategy.
Many variants of CFR are proposed to better integrate
CFR with DRL. Peter et al. [100] proposed advantage-
based regret minimization (ARM), which maps ”informa-
tion set” I in game theory to ”observation” o in reinforce-
ment learning, rewriting the counterfactual action-value
pair as Qpi|o→a(o, a), which means the agent follows pol-
icy pi until o is observed and switches to action a. By the
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approximation vi(σ|I→a, I) = Qpi|o→a(o, a) ≈ Qpi(o, a)
(notation see section 5.2), the clipped advantage function
can be rewritten to express the clipped cumulative regret. So
a Q-learning can be conducted to learn the regret value, with
actions sampled in the same manner as in original CFR. Li
et al. [101] proposed double neural CFR, which is another
NN-based implementation of CFR. Two LSTM networks
are trained in this algorithm, one for estimating the cumu-
lative regret (used to derive the immediate policy) and the
other for estimating an average policy.
Besides applications on traditional card games such as
Limited Texas Hold’em [102] [4], there are attempts to use
deep CFR in games with deception and concealment. Ser-
rino et al. [5] trained deep CFR agents to play Avalon,
a game where players need to deduct others’ identities
and hide their own to achieve their goal, and achieved
super-human performance with human-explainable agents,
though combined with much prior knowledge.
However, as a multi-agent RL algorithm, deep CFR has
two limitations. First, despite that CFR is born for partially
observable environment, it requires the agent to have per-
fect recall i.e. recognize everything that happened in the
past. Most DRL agents without recurrent neural networks
(RNN) like LSTM [103], however, do not have such abil-
ity. Second, there are games that never reaches terminal
state, and agents are trained to maximize average reward in-
stead. Such environment setting is incompatible with CFR.
To solve these problems, Kash et al. [104] proposed a Q-
learning-style updating rule for agents, where agents uses
the CFR algorithm locally in the transition of the Q-learning
operator. The algorithm achieves iterative convergence in
several games such as NoSDE, a class of Markov games
proposed by Littman et al. [20] and specifically designed to
be challenging to learn, where no prior algorithm converges
to an average stationary equilibrium.
6. Conclusion
Deep reinforcement learning has achieved outstanding
results in single-agent scenarios [15] in recent years. How-
ever, learning in multi-agent systems is fundamentally more
difficult and independently using DRL only achieves lim-
ited success in specific problems [42] [43] [44] [16]. Game
theory helps better understand the nature of multi-agent sys-
tems and gives much inspiration to DRL, either in theoreti-
cal concepts or algorithms, producing new techniques capa-
ble of solving multi-agent games which were once consid-
ered impossible [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7].
We note that none of these recent exciting results can
be achieved by deep reinforcement learning or game-
theoretical algorithms alone. However, previous surveys
have always tried to contextualize most of multi-agent
learning literature into either game theory [105] or deep
reinforcement learning [106], which makes it difficult to
understand current multi-agent learning algorithms from a
holistic perspective.
This survey focuses on algorithms in multi-agent sys-
tems derived from both domains, especially their evolution-
ary history and how they have developed from both do-
mains. We analyze the inspiration that solution concepts
give to multi-agent reinforcement learning, how fictitious
self-play ends up into the toolbox of RL, and how CFR is
combined with deep learning and later unified with DRL.
We hope that this survey will incentivize the community of
multi-agent learning to see the close connection between the
domains of DRL and game theory, and motivate future re-
search in this joint field, taking advantage of the ample and
existing literature.
References
[1] Peter Stone and Manuela Veloso. Multiagent systems: A
survey from a machine learning perspective. Auton. Robots,
8(3):345383, June 2000.
[2] David Silver, Julian Schrittwieser, Karen Simonyan, Ioan-
nis Antonoglou, Aja Huang, Arthur Guez, Thomas Hubert,
Lucas Baker, Matthew Lai, Adrian Bolton, Yutian Chen,
Timothy Lillicrap, Fan Hui, Laurent Sifre, George van den
Driessche, Thore Graepel, and Demis Hassabis. Master-
ing the game of go without human knowledge. Nature,
550:354–359, October 2017.
[3] David Silver, Thomas Hubert, Julian Schrittwieser, Ioan-
nis Antonoglou, Matthew Lai, Arthur Guez, Marc Lanctot,
Laurent Sifre, Dharshan Kumaran, Thore Graepel, Timothy
Lillicrap, Karen Simonyan, and Demis Hassabis. Mastering
chess and shogi by self-play with a general reinforcement
learning algorithm. Science, 362:1140–1144, 2017.
[4] Matej Moravk, Martin Schmid, Neil Burch, Viliam Lis,
Dustin Morrill, Nolan Bard, Trevor Davis, Kevin Waugh,
Michael Johanson, and Michael Bowling. Deepstack:
Expert-level artificial intelligence in heads-up no-limit
poker. Science, 356(6337):508513, Mar 2017.
[5] Jack Serrino, Max Kleiman-Weiner, David C. Parkes, and
Joshua B. Tenenbaum. Finding friend and foe in multi-
agent games, 2019.
[6] OpenAI. Openai five. https://blog.openai.com/
openai-five/, 2018.
[7] Oriol Vinyals, Igor Babuschkin, Junyoung Chung, Michael
Mathieu, Max Jaderberg, Wojtek Czarnecki, Andrew
Dudzik, Aja Huang, Petko Georgiev, Richard Powell, Timo
Ewalds, Dan Horgan, Manuel Kroiss, Ivo Danihelka, John
Agapiou, Junhyuk Oh, Valentin Dalibard, David Choi, Lau-
rent Sifre, Yury Sulsky, Sasha Vezhnevets, James Molloy,
Trevor Cai, David Budden, Tom Paine, Caglar Gulcehre,
Ziyu Wang, Tobias Pfaff, Toby Pohlen, Dani Yogatama, Ju-
lia Cohen, Katrina McKinney, Oliver Smith, Tom Schaul,
Timothy Lillicrap, Chris Apps, Koray Kavukcuoglu,
Demis Hassabis, and David Silver. Alphastar: Master-
ing the real-time strategy game starcraft ii. https:
10
//deepmind.com/blog/alphastar-mastering
-real-time-strategy-game-starcraft-ii/,
2019.
[8] Tim Baarslag Enrique Munoz de Cote Pablo Hernandez-
Leal, Michael Kaisers. A survey of learning in multiagent
environments: Dealing with non-stationarity, 2017.
[9] Richard S. Sutton and Andrew G. Barto. Reinforcement
Learning: An Introduction. The MIT Press, second edition,
2018.
[10] Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton. Deep
learning. Nature, 521(7553):436–444, 2015.
[11] Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, David Silver, An-
drei A. Rusu, Joel Veness, Marc G. Bellemare, Alex
Graves, Martin Riedmiller, Andreas K. Fidjeland, Georg
Ostrovski, Stig Petersen, Charles Beattie, Amir Sadik,
Ioannis Antonoglou, Helen King, Dharshan Kumaran,
Daan Wierstra, Shane Legg, and Demis Hassabis. Human-
level control through deep reinforcement learning. Nature,
518(7540):529–533, February 2015.
[12] Timothy P. Lillicrap, Jonathan J. Hunt, Alexander Pritzel,
Nicolas Heess, Tom Erez, Yuval Tassa, David Silver, and
Daan Wierstra. Continuous control with deep reinforce-
ment learning. In Yoshua Bengio and Yann LeCun, editors,
ICLR, 2016.
[13] John Schulman, Sergey Levine, Pieter Abbeel, Michael Jor-
dan, and Philipp Moritz. Trust region policy optimization.
In Francis Bach and David Blei, editors, Proceedings of
the 32nd International Conference on Machine Learning,
volume 37 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research,
pages 1889–1897, Lille, France, 07–09 Jul 2015. PMLR.
[14] John Schulman, Filip Wolski, Prafulla Dhariwal, Alec Rad-
ford, and Oleg Klimov. Proximal policy optimization algo-
rithms, 2017.
[15] Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, David Silver, Alex
Graves, Ioannis Antonoglou, Daan Wierstra, and Martin
Riedmiller. Playing atari with deep reinforcement learning,
2013.
[16] Maithra Raghu, Alex Irpan, Jacob Andreas, Robert Klein-
berg, Quoc V. Le, and Jon Kleinberg. Can deep reinforce-
ment learning solve erdos-selfridge-spencer games?, 2017.
[17] Guillaume J. Laurent, Laetitia Matignon, and Nadine Le-
Fort Piat. The world of independent learners is not marko-
vian, 2011.
[18] Joel Watson. Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory.
W. W. Norton & Company, 2013.
[19] Yoav Shoham and Kevin Leyton-Brown. Multiagent Sys-
tems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Founda-
tions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2009.
[20] Martin Zinkevich, Amy R. Greenwald, and Michael L.
Littman. Cyclic equilibria in markov games. In Proceed-
ings of the 18th International Conference on Neural Infor-
mation Processing Systems, page 16411648, 2005.
[21] Shayegan Omidshafiei, Christos Papadimitriou, Geor-
gios Piliouras, Karl Tuyls, Mark Rowland, Jean-Baptiste
Lespiau, Wojciech M. Czarnecki, Marc Lanctot, Julien Per-
olat, and Remi Munos. α-rank: Multi-agent evaluation by
evolution, 2019.
[22] Lantao Yu, Jiaming Song, and Stefano Ermon. Multi-agent
adversarial inverse reinforcement learning. In 36th Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning, 2019.
[23] Paul Muller, Shayegan Omidshafiei, Mark Rowland, Karl
Tuyls, Julien Perolat, Siqi Liu, Daniel Hennes, Luke Mar-
ris, Marc Lanctot, Edward Hughes, Zhe Wang, Guy Lever,
Nicolas Heess, Thore Graepel, and Remi Munos. A gen-
eralized training approach for multiagent learning. In The
8th International Conference on Learning Representations,
2019.
[24] Yaodong Yang, Rasul Tutunov, Phu Sakulwongtana, and
Haitham Bou Ammar. αα-rank: Practically scaling α-rank
through stochastic optimisation, 2019.
[25] Johannes Heinrich, Marc Lanctot, and David Silver. Ficti-
tious self-play in extensive-form games. In Proceedings of
the 32nd International Conference on International Con-
ference on Machine Learning - Volume 37, ICML15, page
805813. JMLR.org, 2015.
[26] Ulrich Berger. Brown’s original fictitious play. Game the-
ory and information, University Library of Munich, Ger-
many, 2005.
[27] Todd W Neller and Marc Lanctot. An introduction to coun-
terfactual regret minimization. In Proceedings of Model AI
Assignments, The Fourth Symposium on Educational Ad-
vances in Artificial Intelligence (EAAI-2013), 2013.
[28] Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell. A simple adaptive
procedure leading to correlated equilibrium. Econometrica,
68(5):1127–1150, 2000.
[29] Michael N. Katehakis and Arthur F. Veinott. The multi-
armed bandit problem: Decomposition and computation.
Math. Oper. Res., 12:262–268, 1987.
[30] C. J. C. H. Watkins. Learning from Delayed Rewards. PhD
thesis, King’s College, Oxford, 1989.
[31] John N. Tsitsiklis. Asynchronous stochastic approximation
and q-learning. Mach. Learn., 16(3):185202, September
1994.
[32] Ronald J. Williams. Simple statistical gradient-following
algorithms for connectionist reinforcement learning. Ma-
chine Learning, 8:229–256, 1992.
[33] Vijay R. Konda and John N. Tsitsiklis. Actor-critic algo-
rithms. In S. A. Solla, T. K. Leen, and K. Mu¨ller, edi-
tors, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
12, pages 1008–1014. MIT Press, 2000.
[34] G.E.Uhlenbeck and L.S.Ornstein. On the theory of brown-
ian motion. Phys. Rev., 36:823841, 1930.
[35] Volodymyr Mnih, Adria Puigdomenech Badia, Mehdi
Mirza, Alex Graves, Timothy Lillicrap, Tim Harley, David
Silver, and Koray Kavukcuoglu. Asynchronous methods
11
for deep reinforcement learning. In Maria Florina Bal-
can and Kilian Q. Weinberger, editors, Proceedings of The
33rd International Conference on Machine Learning, vol-
ume 48 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research,
pages 1928–1937, New York, New York, USA, 20–22 Jun
2016. PMLR.
[36] Max Jaderberg, Volodymyr Mnih, Wojciech Marian Czar-
necki, Tom Schaul, Joel Z. Leibo, David Silver, and Koray
Kavukcuoglu. Reinforcement learning with unsupervised
auxiliary tasks. CoRR, abs/1611.05397, 2016.
[37] Lasse Espeholt, Hubert Soyer, Remi Munos, Karen Si-
monyan, Vlad Mnih, Tom Ward, Yotam Doron, Vlad
Firoiu, Tim Harley, Iain Dunning, Shane Legg, and Ko-
ray Kavukcuoglu. IMPALA: Scalable distributed deep-RL
with importance weighted actor-learner architectures. In
Jennifer Dy and Andreas Krause, editors, Proceedings of
the 35th International Conference on Machine Learning,
volume 80 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research,
pages 1407–1416, Stockholmsmssan, Stockholm Sweden,
10–15 Jul 2018. PMLR.
[38] L. S. Shapley. Stochastic games. Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, 39(10):1095–1100, 1953.
[39] F Thuijsman. Optimality and Equilibria in Stochastic
Games. Rijksuniversiteit Limburg, 1989.
[40] Arlington M Fink et al. Equilibrium in a stochastic n-
person game. Journal of science of the hiroshima university,
series ai (mathematics), 28(1):89–93, 1964.
[41] John F. Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1):48–
49, 1950.
[42] Ardi Tampuu, Tambet Matiisen, Dorian Kodelja, Ilya Ku-
zovkin, Kristjan Korjus, Juhan Aru, Jaan Aru, and Raul Vi-
cente. Multiagent cooperation and competition with deep
reinforcement learning. PLOS One, 12, 2015.
[43] Joel Z. Leibo, Vinicius Zambaldi, Marc Lanctot, Janusz
Marecki, and Thore Graepel. Multi-agent reinforcement
learning in sequential social dilemmas. In Proceedings of
the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
Systems, AAMAS 17, page 464473, Richland, SC, 2017.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Mul-
tiagent Systems.
[44] Trapit Bansal, Jakub Pachocki, Szymon Sidor, Ilya
Sutskever, and Igor Mordatch. Emergent complexity via
multi-agent competition. In The 35th International Confer-
ence on Machine Learning, 2017.
[45] Emanuel Todorov, Tom Erez, and Yuval Tassa. Mujoco:
A physics engine for model-based control. In IROS, pages
5026–5033. IEEE, 2012.
[46] Michael L. Littman. Markov games as a framework for
multi-agent reinforcement learning. In Proceedings of the
Eleventh International Conference on International Con-
ference on Machine Learning, ICML94, page 157163, San
Francisco, CA, USA, 1994. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers
Inc.
[47] Michael L. Littman. Value-function reinforcement learning
in markov games. Cogn. Syst. Res., 2(1):5566, April 2001.
[48] Michael L. Littman. Friend-or-foe q-learning in general-
sum games. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International
Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 01, page 322328,
San Francisco, CA, USA, 2001. Morgan Kaufmann Pub-
lishers Inc.
[49] Junling Hu and Michael P. Wellman. Nash q-learning
for general-sum stochastic games. J. Mach. Learn. Res.,
4(null):10391069, December 2003.
[50] Amy Greenwald and Keith Hall. Correlated-q learning. In
Proceedings of the Twentieth International Conference on
International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML03,
page 242249. AAAI Press, 2003.
[51] Robert Aumann. Subjectivity and correlation in ran-
domized strategies. Journal of Mathematical Economics,
1(1):67–96, 1974.
[52] Ville Ko¨no¨nen. Asymmetric multiagent reinforcement
learning. In Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC International
Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 03, page
336, USA, 2003. IEEE Computer Society.
[53] Avrim Blum, Nika Hagtalab, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi,
and Saeed Seddighin. Computing stackelberg equilibria of
large general-sum games, 2019.
[54] Michael Bowling. Convergence problems of general-sum
multiagent reinforcement learning. In Proceedings of the
17th International Conference on Machine Learning, page
8994, 2000.
[55] Julien Prolat, Florian Strub, Bilal Piot, and Olivier Pietquin.
Learning nash equilibrium for general-sum markov games
from batch data. In Proceedings of the 20th International
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, vol-
ume 54 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research.
PMLR, 2017.
[56] Keigo Kawamura, Naoki Mizukami, and Yoshimasa Tsu-
ruoka. Neural fictitious self-play in imperfect informa-
tion games with many players. In Workshop on Computer
Games, 2017.
[57] Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, and Shang-Hua Teng. Settling the
complexity of 2-player nash-equilibrium. Journal of the
ACM, 2007.
[58] Charles Conley. Isolated invariant sets and the Morse
index, volume 38. R.I.:American Mathematical Society,
1978.
[59] Mark Rowland, Shayegan Omidshafiei, Karl Tuyls, Julien
Perolat, Michal Valko, Georgios Piliouras, and Remi
Munos. Multiagent evaluation under incomplete informa-
tion. In 33rd Conference on Neural Information Processing
Systems (NeurIPS 2019), 2019.
[60] Julia Robinson. An iterative method of solving a game.
Annals of Mathematics, 54:296–301, 1951.
[61] Koichi Miyasawa. On the convergence of learning pro-
cesses in a 2 x 2 non-zero sum game, 1961.
12
[62] Dov Monderer and Lloyd S. Shapley. Potential games.
Games and Economic Behavior, 14:124–143, 1996.
[63] J. Hofbauer. From nash and brown to maynard smith: Equi-
libria, dynamics and ess. Selection, 1, 2000.
[64] Sunku Hahn. The convergence of fictitious play in 3 x 3
games with strategic complementarities. Economics Let-
ters, 64:57–60, 1999.
[65] Drew Fudenberg and David M. Kreps. Learning mixed
equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior, 5:320–367,
1993.
[66] Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine. The Theory of
Learning in Games. MIT Press, Cambridge, UK, 1998.
[67] S.Perkins and D.S.Leslie. Stochastic fictitious play with
continuous action sets. Journal of Economic Theory,
152:179–213, 2012.
[68] Josef Hofbauer and William H. Sandholm. On the global
convergence of stochastic fictitious play. Econometrica,
70:2265–2294, 2002.
[69] Ben Van Der Genugten. A weakened form of fictitious play
in two-person zero-sum games. International Game Theory
Review, 2, 2000.
[70] David S. Leslie and E.J. Collins. Generalised weakened
fictitious play. Games and Economic Behavior, 56, 2006.
[71] H.W. Kuhn. Extensive games and the problem of informa-
tion. Annals of Mathematical Studies, 28, 1953.
[72] Johannes Heinrich and David Silver. Deep reinforcement
learning from self-play in imperfect-information games,
2016.
[73] Li Zhang, Wei Wang, Shijian Li, and Gang Pan. Monte
carlo neural fictitious self-play: Approach to approximate
nash equilibrium of imperfect-information games, 2019.
[74] Julien Perolat, Bilal Piot, and Olivier Pietquin. Actor-critic
fictitious play in simultaneous move multistage games. vol-
ume 84 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research.
PMLR, 2018.
[75] Abhishek Gupta and Zhaoyuan Yang. Adversarial rein-
forcement learning for observer design in autonomous sys-
tems under cyber attacks, 2018.
[76] Jakob N. Foerster, Richard Y. Chen, Maruan Al-Shedivat,
Shimon Whiteson, Pieter Abbeel, and Igor Mordatch.
Learning with opponent-learning awareness. In AAMAS
’18: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, pages 122–
130, 2017.
[77] Keigo Kawamura and Yoshimasa Tsuruoka. Neural ficti-
tious self-play on elf mini-rts, 2019.
[78] Sainbayar Sukhbaatar, Zeming Lin, Ilya Kostrikov, Gabriel
Synnaeve, Arthur Szlam, and Rob Fergus. Intrinsic moti-
vation and automatic curricula via asymmetric self-play. In
6th International Conference on Learning Representations,
2018.
[79] H. Brendan McMahan, Geoffery J Gordon, and Avrim
Blum. Planning in the presence of cost functions controlled
by an adversary. In Proceedings of the Twentieth Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning, 2003.
[80] Branislav Bosˇansky´, Christopher Kiekintveld, Viliam Lisy´,
and Michal Peˇchoucˇek. An exact double-oracle algorithm
for zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect infor-
mation. J. Artif. Int. Res., 51(1):829866, September 2014.
[81] Manish Jain, Dmytro Korzhyk, Ondrej Vanek, Vincent
Conitzer, Michal Pechoucek, and Milind Tambe. A double
oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs.
In In Proceedings of the International Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 2011.
[82] Marc Lanctot, Vinicius Zambaldi, Audrunas Gruslys, An-
geliki Lazaridou, Karl Tuyls, Julien Perolat, David Silver,
and Thore Graepel. A unified game-theoretic approach to
multiagent reinforcement learning. In Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems 30, 2017.
[83] William E. Walsh, Rajarshi Das, Gerald Tesauro, and Jef-
frey O. Kephart. Analyzing complex strategic interactions
in multi-agent systems. In the 18th National Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, 2002.
[84] Amy Greenwald, Zheng Li, and Casey Marks. Bounds for
regret-matching algorithms, 2006.
[85] Ryan D’Orazio, Dustin Morrill, and James R. Wright.
Bounds for approximate regret-matching algorithms, 2019.
[86] Ryan D’Orazio, Dustin Morrill, James R. Wright, and
Michael Bowling. Alternative function approximation pa-
rameterizations for solving games: An analysis of f -
regression counterfactual regret minimization, 2019.
[87] Martin Zinkevich, Michael Johanson, and Michael Bowlin-
gand Carmelo Piccione. Regret minimization in games with
incomplete information. In Proceedings of the 20th In-
ternational Conference on Neural Information Processing
Systems, 2007.
[88] Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Noam Brown, and Tuo-
mas Sandholm. Stable-predictive optimistic counterfactual
regret minimization. In Proceedings of the 36th Interna-
tional Conference on International Conference on Machine
Learning, 2019.
[89] Oskari Tammelin. Solving large imperfect information
games using cfr+, 2014.
[90] Oskari Tammelin, Neil Burch, Michael Johanson, and
Michael Bowling. Solving heads-up limit texas holdem. In
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.
[91] Michael Johanson, Nolan Bard, Marc Lanctot, Richard
Gibson, and Michael Bowling. Efficient nash equilibrium
approximation through monte carlo counterfactual regret
minimization. In Proceedings of the 11th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sys-
tems, volume 2, pages 837–846, 2012.
[92] Nick Abou Risk and Duane Szafron. Using counterfactual
regret minimization to create competitive multiplayer poker
13
agents. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, volume 1,
pages 159–166, 2010.
[93] Marc Lanctot, Kevin Waugh, Martin Zinkevich, and
Michael Bowling. Monte carlo sampling for regret mini-
mization in extensive games. In Proceedings of the 22nd
International Conference on Neural Information Process-
ing Systems, pages 1078–1086, 2009.
[94] Martin Schmid, Neil Burch, Marc Lanctot, Matej Morav-
cik, Rudolf Kadlec, and Michael Bowling. Variance reduc-
tion in monte carlo counterfactual regret minimization (vr-
mccfr) for extensive form games using baselines. In The
Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
2019.
[95] Richard Gibson, Marc Lanctot, Neil Burch, Duane Szafron,
and Michael Bowling. Generalized sampling and variance
in counterfactual regret minimization. In Proceedings of the
Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 1355–1361, 2012.
[96] Kevin Waugh, Dustin Morrill, J. Andrew Bagnell, and
Michael Bowling. Solving games with functional regret es-
timation. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Confer-
ence on Artificial Intelligence, pages 2138–2144, 2015.
[97] Noam Brown, Adam Lerer, Sam Gross, and Tuomas Sand-
holm. Deep counterfactual regret minimization. In Pro-
ceedings of the 35th International Conference on Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning, 2018.
[98] Noam Brown and Tuomas Sandholm. Solving imperfect-
information games via discounted regret minimization,
2018.
[99] Eric Steinberger. Single deep counterfactual regret mini-
mization, 2019.
[100] Peter Jin, Kurt Keutzer, and Sergey Levine. Regret mini-
mization for partially observable deep reinforcement learn-
ing. volume 80 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Re-
search. PMLR, 2017.
[101] Hui Li, Kailiang Hu, Zhibang Ge, Tao Jiang, Yuan Qi, and
Le Song. Double neural counterfactual regret minimiza-
tion. In The Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, 2019.
[102] Noam Brown and Tuomas Sandholm. Libratus: The super-
human ai for no-limit poker. In Proceedings of the 26th In-
ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, page
52265228, 2017.
[103] Sepp Hochreiter and Ju¨rgen Schmidhuber. Long short-term
memory. Neural computation, 9(8):1735–1780, 1997.
[104] Katja Hofmann Ian A. Kash, Michael Sullins. Combining
no-regret and q-learning, 2019.
[105] Yoav Shoham, Rob Powers, and Trond Grenager. If multi-
agent learning is the answer, what is the question? Artif.
Intell., 171(7):365377, May 2007.
[106] Pablo Hernandez-Leal, Bilal Kartal, and Matthew E. Tay-
lor. A survey and critique of multiagent deep reinforce-
ment learning. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Sys-
tems, 33(6):750797, Oct 2019.
14
